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liability does not seem to be of such portent at present as to make the public
a general agency for the enforcement of the Act.
Conclusion. The enforcement of. the Securities Exchange Act is still in
amorphous formative stages, and it is impossible to indicate any froven effi-'
cacy or failure. The Commission has been provided with various powers
for curbing manipulation; the query now concerns both their intrinsic ade-
quacy and the fashion in which they will be employed. Enforcement will
certainly be aided by definite regulations for stabilizing operations and the
use of options. But even with such rules it is necessary to keep sight of the
fact that proof of large scale manipulation is itself so difficult that it appears
almost impossible to apprehend lesser ventures carried on for profits of a
few points per share. The degree to which this "dishonest speculation!' will
be extirpated by the Exchange Act should provide an interesting experiment
in the public control of a market which failed to function satisfactorily under
the forces of free competition.
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1934
ALTHuOuGH free-trade economists habitually win arguments, protectionists
have consistently won the battles of practical politics, and the history of
American tariffs from the Civil War to 1934 is a record of almost unin-
terrupted increases in protection,' engineered by effective pressure groups,-
and justified by a literature of economic nationalism.3 But the short run dis-
advantages of economic nationalism,4 and its long run consequence of re-
v. Seymour, 14 Daly 420 (N. Y. Com. Pleas 1888). But cf. Brown v. Werblin, 138 is.
29, 244 X. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1930) ; Ballantine v. Cummings, 220 Pa. 621, 70 At.
546 (1908).
1. TAussIG, TAPF IISTORY Or THE Uznir STATns (8th ed. 1931).
2. See PAGE, A &=G THE TMuRr IN THE U rED STATES (1924) 7-20; TAUSSIG,
op. cit. stupra note 1, at 494; Berglund, The Tariff Act of xg92 (1923) 13 A Eco:r.
REv. 14, 27; Culbertson, The Making of Tariffs (1923) 12 YAiix REv. (:. s.) 255;.
Logan, Lobbying (1929) 144 ANATS Supp. 1 cf seq.; (March 17, 1934) 117 LiT.
DiG. 13.
3. See BEARD, THE OpEN DOOR AT HOME (1935); Cnowrnrr , AmlEac&A SELF-
CoN Tnnr (1933); PAuxsAv, THE Ecoxozncs oF SAFEGuAtr nG (1930); Keynes,
National Self-Sufficiency (1933) 22 Ymm.n REv. (N. s.) 755.
4. Typically illustrative of these disadvantages is the course of the recent depres-
sion, which has been intensified and perpetuated by the competition in retaliatory trade
barriers following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. Joms, Tmer RETmaxx oz
(1934). So effectively did these retaliatory measures complement other factors tending
to strangle international trade, that between 1929 and 1933, world commerce declin.d
from $68,152,300,000 to $24,000,000,000, and that of the United States from $10,050,-
840,000 to $3,443,305,000. Berglund, The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of j934
(1935) 25 Ax. Ecom Rsv. 411, 413.
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ducing the standard of living have been generally analyzed and observed, and
a considerable body of opinion mobilized against it.6 A reduction of the
barriers to international trade was one of the objectives of the New Deal,O
and the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 7 was planned to provide a practical
and flexible mechanism for gradually adjusting tariffs downward, avoiding
spectacular dislocation of domestic production, and making every facility in
bargaining available to the Department of State.
The Act provides that in order to expand foreign markets and thereby
restore the "American standard of living," increase employment, and combat
the depression, the President may for three years enter into trade agreements
'with foreign nations and proclaim such modifications of existing import duties
and restrictions as are required to carry out the agreements, whenever he
finds as a fact that such duties or restrictions are "unduly burdening and
restricting" foreign trade. The Act limits the modifications of existing rates
to 50% and forbids the transfer of any article from the free list to the.
dutiable list or vice versa. The President is further authorized to suspend
the application of the new rates to any nation which, in his opinion, dis-
5. BEVEUDGE, TA.uws: THE CASE EXAxnmED (1932) 31-117; S xITn, EcoNouic
PLANNING AND THE TARmuF (1934) 56-142; TAussiG, INTERNATioNAL TRADE (1927)
141-148, 178-196.
6. Plank 4 in the platform of the Democratic Party (1932). N. Y. Times, June
30, 1932, p. 15, col. 3.
7. 48 STAT. 943, 19 U. S. C. § 1351 (1934). The Trade Agreements Act is by no
means the first attempt at tariff reciprocity in the United States. As early as 1785,
a reciprocity treaty with Prussia for equal treatment in customs regulations was signed;
and until 1850 reciprocal agreements to eliminate discriminatory shipping duties among
the nations were frequent. The first really significant reciprocity treaty was con-
cluded with Canada in 1854 and until its termination by the United States in 1866
(probably because of Canadian sympathies with the Confederacy) it was unques-
tionably successful for both nations. Canada made repeated efforts for many years
to renew the agreement but was constantly rebuffed by the United States, yet when
a new treaty was proposed in 1910, Canada refused to ratify it. A similar agreement
with Hawaii in 1876 was terminated by annexation. One with Cuba made in 1903
remained in effect until replaced by the new pact of 1934, concluded under the Trade
Agreements Act. The Tariff Act of 1890 resulted in several reciprocity agreements
by imposing penalty duties on coffee, tea, hides, sugar and molasses imported from
foreign countries which discriminated against United States commerce; and the Act
of 1897 accomplished the same effect by providing for a minimum rate on various
commodities in return for concessions of equality abroad. An attempted two column
tariff based on the same principle was incorporated in the Act of 1909, but the higher
rates were never imposed by the President, and provisions in the Act of 1913 em-
powering him to enter into treaties with foreign nations with the consent of
Congress met with the same executive inaction. From that time until the present Act,
the United States abandoned attempts at reciprocal trade agreements and retained the
single column tariff with provision for countervailing duties or embargoes to be
imposed on discriminating foreign countries. For a more complete history, see BIn-
WELL, TARIFF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1933) 9-55. For an exhaustive economic
survey as well, see REP. TARFF Co.sar., Rcciprocity and Cominercial Treaties (1919).
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criminates against American commerce so as to tend to defeat the purposes
of the Act, and he may also terminate in whole or in part any proclamation
he has issued. Before any agreement is formulated, reasonable public notice
must be given of the intention to negotiate, in order that interested parties
may present their views, and the President is further required to seek in-
formation from the Tariff Commission and the Departments of State, Agri-
culture and Commerce. All agreements entered into must be terminable,
upon due notice to the foreign government concerned, after three years, and
if not then terminated, they are to be subject to termination on six months'
-notice.
Although only fifteen reciprocal trade agreements have thus far been com-
pleted under the Act,8 there is no indication that the program has broken
down, for the slowness with which agreements have been concluded is attri-
buatable to the intense preparation which has preceded all negotiations. After
a preliminary study, announcement is made in three official publications" that
negotiations are being contemplated with a given nation, and complete
statistics on trade between that country and the United States are made
available to those interested. By a modification of the negotiation procedure,
recently announced by the State Department, but not yet applied to any agree-
ment, there will be a second notice which will be accompanied not only by
trade statistics but by a list of all items under consideration for tariff treat-
ment. 0 Six or seven weeks later, hearings are held before a Committee for
Reciprocity Information and anyone who feels that his interests are threatened
*by, or that he has something to gain from, a reciprocal trade agreement with
the nation involved may present an oral statement or file a brief, recom-
mending the commodities which he feels ought to be dealt with in the negoti-
ations. All pertinent suggestions and facts are then organized, digested, and
.*nade ready for use by an interdepartmental Committee for Trade Agree-
ments, upon which are represented the Departments of State, Commerce,
Agriculture, and Treasury and the Tariff Commission. This interdepart-
3nental committee is divided into twenty-eight sub-committees, grouped under
three headings: Country Committees, Commodity Committees, and Special
Committees. It is the duty of the Country Committees to formulate the
.schedules of concessions to be sought and offered in the agreements with
their respective nations. In order to draw up these schedules, all available
information from the departmental experts and from the Committee for Re-
S. Fourteen of these, with Cuba, Brazil, Belgium, Haiti, Sweden, Colombia,
-Canada, Honduras, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Nicaragua, Guatemala, France, and
Ffnland, are already in operation. 19 U. S. C. A. p. 87 (Supp. 1936). The fifteenth,
-with Costa Rica, was signed November 28, 1936, but has not been proclaimed, pending
.approval of the Costa Rican Congress. Negotiations with Ecuador have been announced.
X. Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1937, p. 4, col. 6.
9. Press Releases of the Department of State, Commerce Reports of the Depart-
inent of Commerce, and Treasury Decisions.10. N. Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1937, p. 4, cot. 6.
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ciprocity Information is assembled and analyzed, and finally recommendations
supported by reasons are submitted to the interdepartmental Committee for
Trade Agreements. The Commodity Committees make studies of the par-
ticular problems involved in negotiations with respect to a class or group of
commodities and then present their results to the Country Committees. The
Special Committees, operating in the same manner, study the peculiar ques-
tions surrounding such features of international trade as quotas, exchange
control, and other forms of discrimination. When the efforts of these com-
mittees have all been finally amended and approved by the interdepartmental
committee, they are submitted to the President for tentative approval, and
only then are actual negotiations begun with the representatives of foreign
nations."
The effective agreements, involving fourteen nations with which the United
States did over 37% of its total foreign trade in 1934,12 are very much alike
in form and general provisions. What differences there are between them
lie, for the most part, in the schedules affixed to each one, specifying the exact
concessions to be made, but even there a similarity in types of commodities is
discernible. Lower rates on American-made automotive products, machinery,
and electrical apparatus, and American fresh and canned fruit and meat
products are the principal concessions by the foreign nations involved, while
the chief alterations in the American tariff are that non-competitive products
like coffee, tea, and rubber, are "bound" to the free list,13 and lower rates are
granted on high grade steel, matches, cement, laces, coal-tar dyes, manganese,
whiskey, perfumes, and cheeses. Each agreement further provides that the
United States is to give and receive unconditional most-favored-nation treat-
ment on all customs dfities and formalities. 4 This guarantees the extension
11. Foreign Trade Agreements: Problems, Organizatlion, Procedure and Work
Involved, mimeographed material prepared by the State Department, pp. 3-7.
12. Progress of The Trade Agreements Program, mimeographed material pre-
pared by the State Department, p. 1. During the period from 1926-1930, our average
trade with these nations was approimately 36% of our total world trade. STATiSTICAL
AmsTRAcT oF THE UNITED STATES, DEP'T oF CoamrA ca (1935) 438-442.
13. There is some question as to the efficacy of attempting to increase foreign)
trade by "binding" commodities to the free list. Obviously this is not such a concession
as can encourage new'importation but is merely an effort to coerce reductions from
the contracting nation by threat of penalty. Use of these methods involves the risk
of losing more than is gained by the possible loss of international friendship and im-
position of retaliatory measures. See Black, Tariff Bargains (1934) 238 N. Am. REy.
158. So far, no reprisals have followed United States attempts to use this "binding"
to the free list as a concession.
14. See, e.g., AGREEMENT WITH SVDEw, ART. I. There have been a few excep-
tions to this general rule. In almost all the agreements, regulations to facilitate frontier
traffic and benefits derived from customs unions between adjacent states are exempted
from the operation of most-favored-nation treatment. See, e.g., AGREE ENT WITH THE
NT HEERLANDs, ART. XI, g 1. In the French agreement, a few products are specified on
which France reserves the right to impose lower rates to other nations than the United
[Vol. 46: 647650
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to imported products of the contracting nations the same benefits, privileges
and low rates extended by the importing country to any third nation. The
agreements likewise provide that no new quota, license requirements, or
special restrictions are to be imposed by any nation on the items dealt with
under the agreement, except that restrictions of this sort may be imposed
for moral or humanitarian reasons, to protect public security, human, animal
or plant life, to prohibit prison made goods, or to effectuate regulation of
domestic production of the same commodityY G Whenever quotas are set up
under any of these exceptions,' 8 or whenever the amount of available foreign
exchange is limited after the conclusion of the agreement,"T the contracting
parties are to give the other nation fair notice and a percentage of the quota
or amount of exchange equivalent to that nation',s proportional share.of ship-
ments over a previous "representative period" unspecified in the agreement.
Thus, if during the particular period chosen, the United States had shipped to
Switzerland 457o of the total tobacco imported into that country, and a re-
duced quota was imposed, 457 of that quota would be allotted to the United
States. Further protection against vitiating the effects of the treaty by sub-
sequent action is found in provisions prohibiting a higher internal tax on
imported than on domestic goods,18 forbidding discriminatory treatment in
purchases by government monopolies,' 9 and giving the right of revision or
termination in the event of a wide variation in currency -values produced by
devaluation.2 °
Several of the treaties have additional provisions that extend advantages to
both nations outside the tariff field. In the Cuban treaty, for example, the
fees to be charged for consular certification of invoices and other services
pertaining to documentation of shipments of commodities are reduced from
States. AGRmEEMr wrrTH FFnAcE, ART. I, ff 1, and Schedule I, § A. For a discussion
of the most-favored-nation clause, see Hyde, The Position of the United States on ti
Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Commerdal Treaties, Doc. No. 4, 3d Conference,
Institute of Pacific Relations, Kyoto, Japan (1929) ; Wright, The Mfost-Favored-Nation
Clause (1927) 21 AM. J. INT. L. 760; League of Nations Document, C. 205. M. 79.
1927. V.
15. See, e.g., AGigia n uarai BRAziL, Art. II, 11, 2.
16. See, e.g., AcREMENr wrrI H.mr, ART. VII, f14.
17. See, e.g., AGREE=NT wrriT CANADA, ART. IX.
18. See, e.g., AGREEMENT WITH SwEDEN, ART. VI, 111. In several of the agree-
ments some exceptions to this equality of taxation are made. For example, in the
Canadian pact, the provision does not apply to leaf tobacco, spirits, beer, malt and
malt syrup [AGREEMENT wITH CANAnA, ART. VI]; and in the Swedish treaty, alcohol,
starch, and tobacco are exempted. [AGREEMENT IvITH Svnnii, Arm. VI, 2].
19. See, e.g., AGREEMENT wrrri FRAwCE, ART. IX.
20. See, e.g., AGREEmE wITr BELGIMr. This agreement was concluded in a purely
informal manner by correspondence between the Acting Secretary of State of the United
States, and the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Chief of the
Belgian Delegation. The provision referred to appears in the first proviso of the
fourth paragraph of the American letter.
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5% to 2% of the f. o. b. invoice value.21 By stipulations in notes ancillary
to the Cuban agreement, the embargo on exportation of pineapple slips is
lifted, and one is imposed on avocado shipments between June and Septem-
ber.2 2 In several others, special provisions are made for control of dumping
and improper marking duties.23 The Swiss agreement contains an article
providing an elaborate system for obtaining" Swiss assistance in controlling
the smuggling, of watches into the Unitdd States.2 4 And in the Canadian
agreement, arrangements are made to correct their system of arbitrary valu-
ations, to permit the importation of commercial travelers' samples under bond
rather than under tariff regulations, to allow returning Canadian tourists
$100 worth of imports duty free, and to impose only such tariff.dtities on
imports consigned to Canada but entering through American ports as are
imposed on those entering Canada directly through Canadian ports.25 Finally,
in each agreement, the contracting nations reserve the right to apply any
measures they see fit to restrain the export of arms and munitions, and in
exceptional circumstances, of all other military supplies.20
Although the trade agreements have not been in effect long enough to
indicate conclusively what their results will be, the figures available show
substantial gains for the United States and the foreign nations involved.
During 1935, our foreign sales exceeded those of 1934 by $150,000,000,27
and our imports showed a gain of $402,600,000 for the same period.28 While
it is impossible to separate the gains due to the general improvement in
world conditions and those due to the trade pacts, the figures on Canadian
trade indicate what the proportional effect of the latter factor was, for the
increase of United States exports to Canada on concession items in the first
six months of the treaty's operation was more than 20%o, whereas exports of
other American products increased by less than 10%.29 Furthermore,
Canadian purchases from the United States in the first six months of 1936
showed a greater relative increase over the first half of the preceding year
21. AGREEMENT WITH CUBA, ART. VI.
22. Reciprocal Trade, Executive Series No. 67 (1934) 97.
23. See, e.g., AGREEMENT WITH HAITI, ART. X, and AGREEMENT XWITH COLOMBIA,
ART. IV. 0
24. AGREEMENT WITH SWITZERLAIND, ART. XVII, and DECLARATIONr and forms
affxed thereto.
25. Press Releases, The Department of State, Nov. 23, 1935, p. 393-394.
26. See, e.g., AGREEMENT WITH FINLAND, ART. XVI. For criticism of the inclusion
of these provisions, see Borchard, Neutral Embargoes and Commercial Treaties (1936)
30 AM. J. INT. L. 501, 505.
27. Progress of the Trade Agreements Program, mimeographed material prepared
by the State Department, p. 2.
28. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1935/1936, II Economic
and Financial, 1936, II. A. 8. p. 214.
29. Progress of The Trade Agreements Program, loc. cit. supra note 27. Of course
these figures are not conclusive evidence, since recovery may be more rapid in the
industries producing the concession items than in others.
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than did Canada's total imports from other nations.20 In the same six
months' period, United States imports from Canada rose 23%, and those
from non-agreement nations only 13%.31
As in any case when a statute impinges upon a wide variety of economic
interests, protests voicing constitutional objections to the Trade Agreements
Act may be anticipated. There are serious difficulties, however, in devising
a procedure for formulating such protests in justiciable form, a fact which
may explain why the Act has thus far been challenged in only three cases,
and why, in the only one yet decided, Fletcher v. Unitcd States,32 the attempt
has failed to overcome procedural obstacles.
The tariff acts themselves ordinarily afford procedures for bringing ques-
tions arising under them before the courts. But no such statutory provision
seems to be available in the case of the Trade Agreements Act. That Act
is an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930,33 which provides in Section 516:1
that an American producer or manufacturer who believes the rate of duty
being imposed is improper may protest decisions of the collector and appeal
from his decisions to the United States Customs Courts. But in the Trade
Agreements Act, this provision is specifically made inapplicable "to any article
with respect to the importation of which into the United States a foreign
trade agreement has been concluded . . " Sections 514-5153a of the
Tariff Act of 1930 allow a similar protest and appeal to an aggrieved im-
porter, but the difficulty in relying on this provision in attacking the Trade
Agreements Act is that it is doubtful whether it may be used to protest a
reduction of a rate.37 In the Fletcher case, the plaintiff, obviously repre-
senting American growers, imported several cases of pineapples from Cuba
in order to invoke this provision as a means of attacking a tariff duty which
had been reduced under a trade agreement. The theory offered the court was
ingenious. The early statutes granted the government's consent to protests
against actions of customs officials when the importer vas "dissatisfied"
30. Analysis of Canadian-Avnerican Trade During the First Half Year tudcr the
Reciprocal Agreement, mimeographed material prepared by State Department, Nov. 12,
1936, p. 2. Canada's imports from the United States rose $23,000,000, or 15%co and
those from other countries only 10%.
31. Ibid.
32. T. D. 48634 (1936), petition for rehearing filed, see N. Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1937,
§ 3, p. 9, coL 5. The two other cases, WVislar v. United States (cited in Tvmrznnr
AuAL REPoRT, UNrrrn STATES TAPmFr Conrx, p. 55) and Wislar v. United States
(id. at p. 56) are now pending before the Customs Court.
33. 46 STAT. 590 (1930), 19 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1654 (1934).
34. 46 STAT. 735 (1930), 19 U. S. C. § 1516 (1934).
35. 48 STAT. 944, 19 U. S. C. § 1352 (1934).
36. 46 STAT. 734 (1930), 19 U. S. C. § 1514-4515 (1934).
37. Such statutes have generally been held to operate merely in place of the com-
mon law action of assumpsit to recover illegally e.Mcted duties from the customs col-
lector. See Arnson v. Murphy, 115 U. S. 579, 582 (1885); Schoenfeld v. Hendrichs,
152 U. S. 691, 693 (1894).
1937]
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with the levy made.38 In 1912, in United States v. Schwartz & Co.,30 the
Court of Customs Appeals permitted an importer to protest against a rate as
being too low, holding that he was reasonably "dissatisfied" even though he
suffered no pecuniary loss, since the government had the power to reliquidate
the sum due within one year, and the importer had the right to know whether
his duty was to be raised before he actually sold his merchandise. Probably
because of this decision, Congress changed the protest provisions in the
Tariff Act of 1913 so that they could be utilized only to object on the ground
that a rate was too high.4 ° But in the Act of 1922, from which Section 514
of the Act of 1930 was taken almost verbatim, although the original wording
was not re-adopted, the lirnitation that protests could be made only where
rates were claimed to be t6o high was removed.41 Plaintiff argued in the
Fletcher case that since "a change in language in a tariff statute imports
generally a change in legislative purpose," 42 an assessment could once again
be challenged under the statute as being too low. To the argument that
Section 516 was the exclusive remedy for American producers, it was an-
swered that the Section was designed only for those who could not find the
means of transforming themselves into importers for the purposes of pro-
testing under Section 514. The Customs Court held, however, that if Con-
gress had wished to restore the right supposedly granted by the early statute
under the interpretation of the Schwartz case, it would have reenacted the
identical language or by more specific words manifested such an intention.
In addition, the Court disapproved of the interpretation placed on the earlier
legislation in the Schwartz case. It stated that, in view of the long line of
decisions requiring a litigant in a court of justice to show present or threatened
injury,4" clear statutory authority would be necessary before a court could
disregard this rule and allow an importer to protest against a rate as being
too low; and that nothing in the earlier statute authorized such action,44
the general word "dissatisfied" being merely surplusage, since any protest
implies dissatisfaction. Accordingly, since the plaintiff appeared in the record
only as an importer, and could show no present or threatened injury from the
lower rate, the court dismissed his protest 4 5
38. 26 STAT. 137 (1890).
39. 3 Ct. Cust. App. 24 (1912).
40. 38 STAT. 187 (1913).
41. 42 STAT. 969 (1922), 19 U. S. C. §398 (1934).
42. United States v. Brandenstein, 17 C. C. P. A. 480 (1930).
43. See infra p. 656.
44. The argument is supported by the additional fact that statutes granting the
government's consent to be sued must be strictly construed. United States v. Perryman,
100 U. S. 235 (1879) ; Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163 (1894); Blackfeather
v. United States, 190 U. S. 368 (1903).
45. In the affidavit filed by the plaintiff in the petition for rehearing in Fletcher v.
United States, it was asserted that, in addition to personal losses, the value of products
shipped from Florida was cut 50%, that acreage under cultivation was reduced 40%,
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Although it has been held that the statutory remedies provided by the
tariff acts afford exclusive methods of recovering illegally exacted duties in
a suit against the government,40 this does not preclude the possibility of at-
tacking the Trade Agreements Act in a mandamus, injunction, or declaratory
judgment proceeding against a government official.47 Of these three modes
of obtaining relief, mandamus is probably the least likely to succeed. Pre-
sumably, such a proceeding would be brought to compel the Secretary of
the Treasury or the customs collector to levy a higher duty rate. The first
difficulty which would be encountered is that mandamus will lie only to
compel the performance of a ministerial and not a discretionary act."" In
Louisiana v. McAdoo,49 the Supreme Court definitely held that the duties
imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury in the collection of the tariff
are discretionary, since he must .construe the laws and treaties in order
to make his decisions. It would seem that the act of disregarding the Trade
Agreements Act and levying the higher rate would also be discretionary,
both on the part of the Secretary and the collector, inasmuch as it would-
involve an interpretation of the Constitution. .But in any event, a mandamus
action would have to be brought in the federal courts,co and it has been
frequently held that, except for the courts of the District of Columbia,'
they.have no original jurisdiction in mandamus cases, but may issue the
extraordinary writ only as ancillary to jurisdiction already obtained. - This
that 5,000 workers lost their jobs, and that the value of land dropped $M an acre
because of the reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba.
46. Nichols v. United States, 7 Wall. 122 (U. S. 186S); see Cheatham v. United.
States, 92 U. S. 85, 88 (1875). The theory is that a suit against the government must
be brought strictly in accordance with the statute by which the government has given its
consent to be sued.
47. It is a familiar principle that a suit against an officer acting under an un-
constitutional statute is regarded as an action against him as an individual, and not
against the state. Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1903) (injunction); United States
ex rel. Huidekoper v. Hadley, 177 Fed. 1 (C. C.A. 8th, 1910), revug 171 Fed. 118
(C. C E. D. Mo. 1909), dismissed per stipulation of counsel. 223 U. S. 735 (1911)
(mandamus).
48. United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40 (1823); United States ex
rel. Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 294 U. S. 60 (1935) ;
2 BALEy, HAEms CoRvsS (1913) 855; HIGH, E%-RAoRDnTAry Ix.rcA. RE ms (3d
ed. 1896) §24; see Rapacz, Protcction of Officers W1ho Act Under Unconstitutional
Statutes (1927) 11 MfIn. L. REV. 585.
49. 234 U. S. 627 (1914).
50. M'Clung v. Silliman, 6 Wkheat. 598 (U. S. 1S21); Ex tarte Shoddey, 17 F.
(2d) 133 (N. D. Ohio 1926) ; see In re Blake, 175 U. S. 114, 119 (1899) ; ef. Ohio v.
Thomas, 173 U. S. 276 (1899).
51. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (U. S. 1833); Decatur v. Paulding, 14
Pet. 497 (U. S. 1840); United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 123 U. S. 40 (1833); 2
BAILnY, HAE AS CoRPus (1913) 853.
52. Riggs v. Johnson, 6 WaiL 166 (U. S. 1867); Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U. S.
450 (1887); 2 BAILEY, M]z&n.s CoRpus (1913) 8S5. The Supreme Court itself may
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rule could therefore be avoided only if a mandamus proceeding could be
arranged in the District of Columbia.
Difficulties of this nature would not be encountered in a suit for an in-
junction or declaratory judgment, but another obstacle common to all three
types of relief would be presented. This, the most serious barrier to any
action to contest the constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, is the
question of whether the party raising the issue has sufficient legal interest
to support a standing in court. It is familiar doctrine that the constitution-
ality of a statute cannot be attacked by one who has not been directly and
substantially injured by its application.53 In Frothinglham v. Mellon, for
example, the Supreme Court refused to review the constitutionality of a
federal appropriation act challenged by a taxpayer when it appeared "merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."6 4
Since tariffs are lowered rather than raised under the Trade Agreements
Act, 5 the persons who could claim the most immediate injury would be
those American manufacturers or producers who feel that the lowered tariff
rates destroy their margin of profit by permitting the competition of foreign
commodities. But whether they can show a sufficiently substantial and direct
injury is very doubtful. In Louisiana v. McAdoo, the State of Louisiana,
as a sugar grower, attempted to challenge a reduction in the duty on sugar
imports, and as one of the grounds for rejecting the claim, the Supreme
Court declared that the state, in its capacity as a producer, could not show
"definite and distinct interest" in whether the rate collected was too low.
50
Some of the producers affected by the Trade Agreements Act may be able
to demonstrate a much more substantial injury than was there shown. For
example, as a result of the reduction of the duty on manganese, the few
American producers of .that commodity may virtually be driven out of busi-
ness. 7 Yet such producers will find it difficult to prove that the injury is
direct, for the immediate cause of the harm to them is not the lowered duty
itself, but the competition of the foreign goods.
Even if the plaintiff manufacturer could satisfactorily prove that his in-
jury was substantial and direct, his suit might encounter further difficulties
because of the frequently reiterated statement that "no one has a vested
issue mandamus in an original action but only in those cases over which it has originaljurisdiction under tle Constitution. In Louisiana v. McAdoo, the Court had original
jurisdiction because a state and the United States were parties.
53. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126 (1922); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S.
447 (1923); cf. Champion Coated Paper Co. v. United States, T. D. 47421 (Cust. Ct.
3d Div. 1934); see BoncHARn, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 36; Comment (1934)
47 HAnv. L. REv. 677.
54. 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923).
55. Although the power of the President under the Act is not limited to decreases
in rates, its purpose obviously looks toward such action exclusively.
56. 234 U. S. 627, 631 (1914).
57. PEEr, WHY QUIT OuR Ow x? (1936) 267; cf. note 45, stepra.
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right in the tariff. ' 58 The legal significance of this phrase is indefinite. In
many cases it seems to be used merely as a make-weight, pointing out that,
if the regulation imposed is otherwise constitutional, there can be no ob-
jection merely because it injures property. 0 It has also been e.-plained
as meaning that, since Congress has complete power over foreign commerce,
importation is not a right but a privilege, perhaps protected less carefully
than "rights" by constitutional restrictions.00 Whether the latter argument
may be used in the present situation is somewhat doubtful, however, since
the manufacturer or producer attacking the Act is not objecting to the
revocation of the privilege to import, but at most is claiming an interference
with his right to manufacture or farm, which is certainly not an activity
completely within the power of Congress.
Attempts might be made to avoid the foregoing difficulties in bringing suit
by obtaining the cooperation of a customs collector. The collector might be
persuaded to exact the higher rate which would be imposed in the absence
of the trade agreement, so that an action for return of the excess duties
could be brought under Section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930; but the issue
of constitutionality would probably not be raised in such a suit, since the
govehinment, as party defendant, would presumably merely confess judg-
ment and pay the sum requested.6 ' It might also be possible to prevail upon
the collector to institute a declaratory judgment action to determine whether
he should exact more than the lower duty.0 2 The chief difficulty would be to
demonstrate that the collector was threatened with peril because he would
be liable to suit for failing to collect a higher duty if the Trade Agreements
Act were subsequently declared unconstitutional.03 It is hardly conceivable
5S. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 493 (1904).
59. The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166 (1912); Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S.
216 (1915); Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325 (1915); Trustees of the University v.
United States, 289 U. S. 48 (1933); see Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. I00,
125 (1923) ; in re Orion Co., 71 F. (2d) 458, 465 (C. C. P.A. 1934).
60. See Powell, Separation of Powers (1912) 27 Por. Scr. Q. 215, 23S; Comment
(1930) 40 YALE L. J. 10S, 114, n. 42; cf. Bates and Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106
(1904); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904); United States v. Ju
Toy, 19S U. S. 253 (1905).
61. The government could apparently contest the constitutionality of the Act.
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). The unusual character of such a con-
tention by the government was mentioned in the Myers case by counsel [id. at 57],
but not by the Court:
62. See BoacNAiw, DECLA ATORY JUDGE nS (1934) 349-353.
63. In the absence of any peril or insecurity, the collector may not brin. any lind
of action to determine the constitutionality of an act, as he cannot show sufficient legal
interest. Smith v. Indiana, 191 U. S. 138 (1903); Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v.
Miller, 283 U. S. 96 (1931); State ex rel. Fletcher v. Executive Council, 207 Iowa
923, 223 N.W. 737 (1929); see Brandeis, J., concurring in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) ; Rapacz, Protection of Officers Who Act Under
Unconsitutional Statutes (1927) 11 Mn-T. L. REv. 585, 593.
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that he could be subjected to such a suit by the government, which itself
enacted the Trade Agreements Act.04 A threatened action by an American
producer would therefore be the only possible danger, and it is questionable
whether this threat would be serious enotigh to qualify the collector as a
proper party to bring suit in view of the difficulty the producer would
experience in establishing such a claim.05 Furthermore, there would be the
additional difficulty that any action brought by or against a collector who
was cooperating with the other party to the proceeding might be dismissed
as being collusive.60
One possible method of raising the issue remains. The Trade Agreements
Act extends unconditional most-favored-nation treatment to all countries, in
that the rate set up by the agreements apply to the products of all foreign
nations, whether they have agreements of their own or not. But the Act
provides that the President may suspend the application of the rates to any
nation which he finds is discriminating against American commerce.07 An
importer of products from a nation which has been put on the restricted list
may contend that this power to suspend the application of the unconditional
most-favored-nation clause has been unconstitutionally delegated, that he is
entitled to the same low rate of duty on a given commodity as the importers
from other nations, and that he may therefore bring an action under Section
64. In Walker v. United States, 139 Fed. 409 (C. C. M. D. Ala. 1905), aff'd with-
out opinion, 148 Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 5th, 1906), a federal marshal had paid his deputy
a salary out of government funds, relying upon the commonly accepted meaning of a
federal statute. Several years later, the government sued the marshal, claiming that
the payments were illegal. It was held that the government was estopped because it
had acquiesced in the marshal's action for many years. See Heidt v. United States,
56 F. (2d) 559, 560 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); cf. State v. Carr. 191 Fed. 257 (C C. A.
8th, 1911).
In State v. Godwin, 123 N. C. 697, 31 S. E. 221 (1898), an official failed to perform
his duty under one statute relying on a later statute, subsequently declared unconsti-
tutional. In a criminal action for failure to perform his duty, judgment was given for
the defendant. And see note 61, supra.
65. See p. 656, supra. The authorities are divided as to whether an action for
damages for injury to property will lie against an officer who has dcted under an
unconstitutional statute. See Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute On The
Law of Public Officers: Liability of Officer for Action or Non-Action (1928) 77 U.
oF PA. L. Rav. 155, 167-170.
66. Compare Chicago & G. T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339 (1892), and Drew-
ington v. Lowe, 1 Inad. 21 (1848), with Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (U. S.
1796) ; see Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147 (U. S. 1810) ; BoRcnA.D, DEcLARAToRY
JUDGMENTS (1934) 57; 1 WILLOUGBm, CoNsTiTuToNA. LAW (2d ed. 1929) § 15.
67. Germany and Australia are at present on this restricted list. Denmark, Italy,
and Portugal are on a supplemental warning list and will be placed on the restricted
list provided that they do not shortly cease discrixninations against American commerce.
The balance of the world receives the benefit of most-favored-nation treatment. Letter
from the President to the Secretary of the Treasury, Oct. 3, 1936, released for the
press by the Department of State on the same day.
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514 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to recover the excess duties he has paid under
the higher levy.68 In order to prove that he has a valid claim, however, the
importer must seek the benefits of one part of the statute, that empowering
the President to make the agreements, while attacking the second part, author-
izing him to suspend their application to discriminating nations. It is fre-
quently stated as a general rule that one may not attack the constitutionality
of a statute under which benefits have been derived or are being soughtC
But where the benefits have been acquired under an original statute, an
amendment may still be attacked as unconstitutional, the reason advanced
being simply that the original statute is enforceable by itself.7 Since this
explanation is one usually offered as a test of separability, it suggests that
where two co-ordinate provisions of the same statute are involved, the
plaintiff might attack one although claiming benefits under the other, pro-
vided that the provisions were separable. A few state courts have adopted
this view, at least where the benefits were not sought or received from the
identical section of the statute attacked.72 But the Supreme Court appears
to have consistently ignored this possibility, and has held that under such
conditions, the plaintiff was estopped from questioning the validity of the
Act.73 Even if the Court should adopt the suggested rule, the plaintiff would
not find it easy to demonstrate that the provision authorizing the maldng of
agreements was separable from the provision delegating the power to exclude
discriminating nations.74
If the two provisions were regarded as separable, and the challenge per-
mitted, a decision as to the constitutionality of the entire Act might never-
theless be unobtainable. For a court might decide that the delegation of
the power to exclude discriminating nations was constitutional, in which
event it would presumably not pass upon the remainder of the Act. And
even if that delegation were held unconstitutional, the government probably
would not defend further against the plaintiff's claim for a return of the
68. This method is the one being employed in Wislar v. United States, (cited in
TWENTmTH AxuAL REPorr, UNrrED STATES TAP=r Co., p. 55), now pending bafore
the Customs Court. a
69. Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U. S. 407 (1917); Hurley v. Com-
mission of Fisheries, 257 U. S. 223 (1921); Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 271 U. S. 20S (1926). But see Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v.
Kansas City, 58 F. (2d) 593, 606 (C. C. A. Sth, 1932). For general discussion, see
Comment (1935) 48 HAzv. L. REv. 983.
70. Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515 (1929). But cf. dissenting
opinion of Brandeis, J., id. at 531.
71. See Comment (1936) 46 Y.Arx L. J. 130, 137.
72. Mojave River Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 717, 262 Pac. 724 (1927);
Kristanik v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 335 Mo. 60, 70 S. IV. (2d) 890 (1934); Baker v.
Coman, 109 Te. 85, 198 S. W. 141 (1917) ; see Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Independent Life Ins. Co., 67 F. (2d) 470, 473 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
73. See cases cited .spra note 69.
74. Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
19371 659
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
excess duties on the ground that the delegation of the power to make agree-
ments was unconstitutional. It is at least conceivable, however, that the
court would take it upon itself to render judgment on the validity of the
entire Act. In the Rock Island case, for example, several parties, including
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, objected to orders entered in a
reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. No contention was
made that the statute was unconstitutional in its general scope and appli-
cation, yet the Court said, " . . . since the question [of constitutionality] is
inherently fundamental, we deem it necessary to consider and dispose of it
in liliine . . 7
If the procedural barriers to an attack on the Trade Agreements Act are
successfully negotiated, there remains the more basic issue of its validity.
The Act contemplates the exercise of two governmental powers: that of
making international agreements other than treaties, and that of reducing
tariffs. Although authority to enter into international agreements legs formal
than treaties is nowhere expressly granted in the Constitution, it is concededly
part of the power to control foreign affairs which is vested in the federal
government ;7 under American practice, such agreements have traditionally
been made by the executive rather than the legislative branch of the govern-
ment.77 On the other hand, tariff making has always been considered a
function of the legislative branch of the federal government, as part of the
power given it in the Constitution to levy duties 7s and control foreign com-
merce.17 It is. probable that Congress could not constitutionally enter into
75. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 294
U. S. 648, 667 (1935).
76. Under international law, powdr over foreign affairs relts with the sovereign.
See CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEWENT (2d. ed. 1916) 1;
Anderson, The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power Un1der the Col-
stitution (1907) 1 A-M. J. INT. L. 636. It has been said that the United States is a
sovereign member of the family of nations and therefore vested with this power. Sao'
Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 568-570 (U. S. 1840)', Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
v. United States, Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1936; cf. Conwn, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF
FOREIGN RELATIoNs (1917) 1-6; CoawN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY (1913) 21-58; Wilson,
International Law and the Constitution (1933) 13 B. U. L. Rv. 234-251.
It has also been stated that the power is derived as well from the Constitution, either
expressly or by implication. See Moore, The Control of the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1921, p, 3, in REPRINTS AND PAMPHLETS, Yale Law Library. Support
for this view can be found in the affirmative grants of authority to branches of the
federal government to make treaties and appoint ambassadors [U. S. CoNsT. Art. It, § 2,
cl. 2], to regulate commerce with foreign nations [id. Art. 1, § 8, ci. 3], to punish
violations of international law [id. cl. 10], and to declare war [id. cl. 11], and the
denial to the states of power to enter into treaties, alliances, confederations [id. § 10,
cl. 1], or (without the consent of Congress) into compacts or agreements fid. cl. 3].
77. See CoRwiN, THE PRESMENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATbONS (1917) 116-120;
CRANDAL, op. cit. supra note 76, at 102.
78. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
79. Id. cl. 3.
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agreements with foreign nations,s" and it is possible that the e-ecutive could
not, without statutory authority, make an effective trade agreement regu-
lating tariffs, since such an agreement might not have the status of a treaty,8 '
and the existing tariff legislation might therefore remain the law of the
land. 2 The technique of the Trade Agreements Act seemed a practical way
to obtain international agreements regulating tariff rates; it resolves the
division of authority between Congress and the executive by having Congress
delegate its tariff-making powers to the President who is capable of nego-
tiating with foreign nations.8 3 Upon the validity of this delegation rests the
constitutionality of the Act.A
The criterion by which the courts purport to determine whether a par-
ticular delegation of legislative power can be reconciled with the principle
of separation of powers84 is whether Congress has established sufficiently
80. See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. v. United States, Sup. Ct, Dec. 21, 1936;
Black, The Role of the President and the Senate in the Trealy-Maing Powo-r (1926)"
11 ST. Louts L. REv. 203, 215.
81. No cases have been found deciding the status of agreements concluded without
statutory authority. Agreements entered into in pursuance of statute have been con-
sidered treaties for jurisdictional purposes. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S.
583 (1912); see CRAamLL, op. cit. stspra note 76, at 123, n. 11. But it vas recognized
in the Atman case that sucAi agreements are not treaties in the constitutional sense. For
a discussion, see Lenoir, Treaties and the Supreme Court (1934) 1 U. oF" CU. L. Rrv.
602, 608-609.
82. See Anderson, The Recent Trade Agreement TVitlh Riusi (1935) 29 Amr. I.
Iq. L 653, 655-656; cf. Moore, Treaties and B.Zecitive Agreements (1905) 20 PoL
Scr. Q. 385, 393. It has even been suggested that a subsequent treaty might not super-
sede tariff legislation. See Anderson, .rtpra note 76, at 650-653.
83. But cf. Moore, supra note 76, at 3: "In regard to . . . 'congressional dele-
gation of power to make international agreements', I have . . . always, been inclined
to think that no 'delegation! of power whatever is involved in the matter. As Con-
gress possesses no power whatever to make international agreements, it has no such
power to delegate. All that Congress has done in the cases referred to is to exercise
beforehand that part of the function belonging to it in the carrying out of a particular
class of international agreements. Instead of waiting to legislate until an agreement
has been concluded and then acting on the agreement specifically, Congress has merely
adopted in advance general legislation under which agreements, falling within its
terms, become effective immediately on their conclusion or their proclamation."
83a. It has been argued that the matters covered by the agreements can properly be
dealt with only by treaty; and that the agreements cannot be sustained as treaties, because
the Senate's power of ratification, if.delegable at all, is not properly delegated in the Trade
Agreements Act. See Comment (1936) 24 Gro. L. J. 717, 718. But it seems probable
that tariff reciprocity may be accomplished by executive agreements, at least if made
pursuant to statute, as well as by treaties. Cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1S92);
ComvN, op. cit. stpra note 77, at 117, 120-125. And see note 110, infra.
84. The doctrine of separation of powers is not affirmatively asserted in the Con-
stitution, but is derived fr6m Art. I, § 1 and Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, giving legislative powei
to Congress. For general discussion of this doctrine, see 3 WxLLouGxHB, COsIriU-
TiorTA. L'Aw (3d ed. 1929) §§ 1058-1086.
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definite standards to guide the exercise of the power.8 5 Until 1935, the
Supreme Court had in no case held an act of Congress delegating power to
the executive invalid under this test.88 Various vague standards, such as
"public interest"Sfa "undesirable residents,"87 "educational, moral, amusing,
or harmless,"8 8 "purity, quality, and fitness for consumption," 8D "safe, pure
and affording a satisfactory light," 00 and even "reasonable"' 1 were held to
furnish a sufficient guide for the exercise of the power. 2 A delegation of
tariff making power quite similar to that of the Trade Agreements Act was
upheld in J. W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 3 in which the flexible
tariff provisions of the Tariff Act of 192204 were attacked. By that Act,
the President was authorized to increase or decrease by 50% the import
duty on any commodity in order to equalize the difference between the costs
of production abroad and in the United States. The Supreme Court held
85. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892); United States v. Shreveport Grain &
Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (1932); Fed. Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge.
Co., 289 U. S. 266 (1933); Precision Castings Co. v. Boland, 13 F. Supp. 877 (W. D.
N. Y. 1936) ; cf. Amchanitzky v. Carrougher, 3 F. Supp. 993 (E. D. N. Y. 1933) ; see
Comment (1935) 48 IARv. L. REv. 798.
86. But cf. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920) (delegation of
power to states held invalid).
86a. N. Y. Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932).
87. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 (1924).
88. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 236 U. S. 230 (1915).
89. Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606 (1918).
90. Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 T. S. 380 (1912).
91. Avent v. United States, 266 U: S. 127 (1924).
92. The state courts have not always been as lenient and such concrete standards
as the following have been held insufficient to permit delegation: prevailing rate of
wages [Mayhew v. Nelson, 346 Ill. 381, 178 N. E. 921 (1931) (government contracts)];
business methods, experience, ability, general reputation for integrity, financial standing
[Moore v. Beekman & Co., 347 Ill. 92, 179 N. E. 435 (1931) (bonding security dealers)) ;
fairness and equity between insurers and insured, brevity and simplicity, avoidance of
technical words and phrases, avoidance of conditions, use of large type, separation into
numbered paragraphs [King v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 140 Mich. 258, 103 N. W. 616
(1905) (standard insurance policies)]. But cf. State v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220
N.W. 929 (1928), for a more liberal state view.
93. 276 U. S. 394 (1928). Other delegations of legislative power in the tariff field
were upheld in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892) (reciprocal trade agreements under
Tariff Act of 1890); Frischer v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. P. A. 1930)
(increase in tariff rates to meet foreign unfair competition) ; Kleburg & Co. v. United
States, 71 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. P. A. 1933) (anti-dumping duties); United States v. Fox
River Butter Co., T. D. 45675 (C. C. P. A. 1932), rcv'g T. D. 44667 (Cust. Ct., 3d
Div. 1931), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 628 (1932) (change in classification under flexible
tariff provision of Tariff Act of 1930) ; United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., T. D.
46086 (C. C. P. A. 1932) (change in rate under flexible tariff provision of Tariff Act
of'1930). See also Comments (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 108, (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. RzV.
974; (1927) 41 H.Iv. L. Rxv. 95; (1931) 44 H, v. L. Rv. 1140; (1932) 27 Ill.
L. Rxv. 302.
94. 42 STAT. 941 (1922), 19 U. S. C. § 154 (1934).
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that, although it may be difficult to determine such differences in cost,
Congress' objective was clear enough, and that consequently a satisfactory
criterion for executive action was provided. But in two cases decided in
1935-Panama.Refining Co. v. Ryan93 and Scheclhter Poultry Corp. v.
United States90 - the Supreme Court invalidated the National Industrial
Recovery Act,07 holding that the delegation of legislative power to the Pres-
ident was defective because the general standards of policy set up by Congress
were so broad that they provided no limitation on the executive authority,
but rather gave "a roving commission to inquire into evils, and upon dis-
covery correct them. '" s
Despite their emphasis on the need for careful standards to restrict ad-
ministrative action, the cases have made it clear that the standards which
Congress must establish in order to satisfy constitutional proprieties are
defined with reference to the factual setting in which the particular admin-
istrative activity is undertaken. The operation of this principle is strikingly
illustrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exkort Corp.P9 That case involved the validity of a Congressional
resolution 0 0 delegating to the President the power to impose an embargo
on the shipment of arms and munitions to belligerent nations. Although the
only standard set up to guide the President in determining when he should
forbid such exports was the requirement that he find that the embargo "may
contribute to the reestablishment of peace," the Supreme Court, with Mr.
justice McReynolds dissenting, held the delegation constitutional. The Court
did not decide whether this standard would have been adequate to support
a delegation of power over internal matters, but stated that an unusually
large degree of discretion could constitutionally be granted to the President
in the exercise of an authority which would inevitably have an effect on, and
involve participation in, foreign affairs. Two somewhat inter-related pro-
positions are discernible as the grounds for this conclusion.
The first is that as a matter of practical efficiency, the President must be
given a relatively free hand in dealing with problems affecting foreign rela-
tions. His special knowledge of affairs abroad, the necessity that he be un-
embarrassed and free to act quickly, and the need for secrecy in the conduct
of international negotiations are all considerations requiring that his action
in this field be as free as possible. This view that practical necessities help
to'define the constitutional restrictions on the exercise of a particular dele-
gated power is apparent not only in cases concerning foreign relations,10 '
95. 293 U. S. 3S8 (1935).
96. 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
97. 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §701 (1934).
98. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 551 (1935).
99. U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1936.
100. 48 STAT. 811 (1934). See Comment (1933) 42 YAL. _J. 1109.
101. The Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch 382 (U. S. 1813); United States
v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525 (1913).
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but also where internal matters of some complexity, detail or technicality have
been involved.102
But the Supreme Court advanced another proposition, apparently novel
in the literature relating to delegation of power, to explain why an unusual
degree of discretion could constitutionally be given to the executive under
the embargo resolution.' 03 The Court emphasized that it was "dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative
power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exd
clusive power of the President as the sole organ of the Federal Government
in the field of international relations-a power which does not require as a
basis for its exercise an act of Congress, . . . " This statement seems to
indicate that where the executive is entrusted with legislative authority to
be exercised in conjunction with and in aid of one of his own sovereign, or
perhaps constitutional duties, in this case his authority as agent of the nation
in foreign affairs, constitutional requirements of definiteness in delegation
will be satisfied by a general indication from the legislature as to how it
wishes the delegated tower to be used.
Finally, the Court buttressed its conclusion by referring to the lengthy
history of comparable legislation, a factor which, while not controlling, is
a strong indication of constitutionality not to be disregarded in the absence
of a clear usurpation of power.1
04
In the perspective of past decisions, there can be little doubt as to the va-
lidity of the Trade Agreements Act. Although its stated aims of restoring the
standard of living, increasing employment and combating the depression are
reminiscent of the vague standards set up in the National Industrial Recovery
Act, it contains in addition more detailed limitations, similar to those which
were approved in the Hampton case, such as the provisions that existing
rates of duty cannot be changed by more than 507o, and that transfers from
the free and dutiable lists are prohibited; and the President must find quite
specifically that existing duties of the United States or of a foreign nation
are unduly burdening the foreign trade of the United States, which appears
to be as adequate a limitation as that approved in the Hampton case, where
a finding was required that existing duties do not equalize the production
cost of the domestic article and of the like foreign article. Furthermore, the
102. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 (1907), and Monongalhela
Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 (1910) (both involving determination of
height of bridges over navigable river); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506
(1911) (granting permission for grazing in Forest Reserves); Intermountain Rate
Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914), and Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,
284 U. S. 370 (1932) (both involving fixing of railroad rates); see Cheadle, The
Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YAME L. J. 892, 920.
103. This principle was perhaps foreshadowed by language used in Panama Re-
fining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 422 (1935).
104. The Laura, 114 U. S. 411 (1885); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901). And see note 110 infra.
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executive is limited to the performance of one type of action-modification
of tariff duties. '"He is not left to roam at will among all the possible sub-
jects of" foreign commerce.105
But more significant than the possible distinctions between the standards
set up in the National Industrial Recovery Act and those employed in the
Trade Agreements Act is the strong probability that the criteria estab-
lished in the latter statute will be subjected to less stringent constitutional
requirements because of the marked similarity between the factual situation
presented by the Trade Agreements Act and that involved in the Ctirtiss-
Wright case. In the first place, facts can be adduced with respect to the
Trade Agreements Act demonstrating a practical necessity for delegation
similar to that which was one basis for the decision in the embargo resolu-
tion case. Although large revisions of tariff schedules have always been
completely in the hands of Congress until the present Act, O the technical
complexities and the mass of heterogeneous detail107 inherent in the tariff-
making process make it entirely appropriate for that function to be placed
wholly or partially in the hands of an administrative body. And this position
is reinforced when, as under the Trade Agreements Act, tariff regulation is
associated with the conduct of foreign relations. Tariff bargaining requires
all the executive discretion that has been judged necessary in the adminis-
tration of other foreign affairs, for the application to this type of activity
of the limitations on delegations of power over internal matters might prove
a source of the same serious "serious embarrassment" that the Court recog-
nized might arise if the arms embargo resolution of 1934 were held invalid.
This need of flexibility in commercial negotiation is emphasized at the
present time by the acuteness of the congestion in international trade, to a
certain extent caused, and now being somewhat mitigated, by a long seriei
of international trade agreements, mainly of the bilateral type.' s To par-
ticipate successfully in this process of bargaining, negotiators for the United
States should be equipped with discretionary powers comparable to those
given representatives of foreign nationsl)t°
105. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 383, 434 (1935).
106. It is true that the Tariff Commissioh has done much of the ground breaking and
technical -work but their decisions have never been operative in themselves, serving
rather as a guide to Congress, which may ignore them at will. See PAGr, MA='.G TRH
T. rF I THE UNrrE STrTs (1924) 21.40. The President, likewise, by fle.'ible tariff
clauses, has been given some power to change individual rates upon given conditions, but
the final determination of the whole body of tariff duties has always rested with the
House of Representatives and the Senate.
107. See PAGE, op. cit. supra note 106, 64-170.
10. From January 1, 1933 to April 26, 1934, seventy-seven bilateral trade agree-
ments were concluded between foreign nations. Hearigs before Senate Committee on
Finance on H. & 8687, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 48. See also Womo Eco o:c Sunv ,
1935/1936, II Economic and Financial, 1936, II. A. 15. pp. 192-213.
109. Executives of twenty-six foreign nations may change duty rates without reference
to the legislature and twelve others may make such changes provisional vpon approval
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The similarity between the arms embargo resolution and the Trade Agree-
ments Act is even more striking in that the second reason offered by the
Court for the Curtiss-Wright decision is equally applicable here. While the
limits of the doctrine there enunciated-that a general indication by the
legislature of the course it wishes the executive to follow will suffice when
the power delegated is to complement the exercise of some power peculiarly
in the hands of the executive-are not yet clearly marked, such cooperation
between Congress and the President as is provided in the Trade Agreements
Act definitely seems to be included within its scope. Delegation of tariff-
making powers, to be used by the President as an instrument to increase
trade, and thereby contribute to peace, and other ends within the interest
of diplomatic policy, resembles the delegation in the Arms Embargo Resolu-
tion of 1934, which transferred to the President the power to levy embargoes,
to be used in aid of peace through his power over foreign affairs. The analogy
is made complete by the fact that legislative precedent for the Trade Agree-
ments Act is as plentiful as that relied upon by the Court in the Curtiss-
Wiright case." 0
It remains to examine the effectiveness of the procedure contemplated by
the Act as an instrument for achieving its purposes.
The first criticism directed at any extended delegation of authority to an
administrative or executive body is the danger of "bureaucracy." '111 Solici-
tude for the preservation of democratic safeguards under the Trade Agree-
ments Act seems adequately satisfied by the restrictions under which the
delegated power is to be exercised. The President does not act alone, but
with members of the Tariff Commission and the various executive depart-
ments. His powers are limited in time, to three years; in character, to those
treaties which will promote foreign trade; and in scope, to 50% of existing
duties. Provision is made for hearings, and publication of agreements, both
by the legislature. Additional consideration must be given the fact that most foreign
nations operate on the ministerial principle, which makes ratification of such treaty rates
a matter of course, in the absence of some larger disagreement as to policy between-the
minister and his party. Id. at 52-55. Contrast the situation in the United States where,
between 1844 and 1902, of twenty-four reciprocity treaties negotiated under the general
treaty making power, only three were finally confirmed. Deimel, Trade Agreeiculs in
a Balanced Tariff Policy, Address before the Southern Political Science Ass'n, Nov. 5,
1936, mimeographed material prepared by the State Department, p. 7.
110. The Tariff Act of 1890 authorized the President to suspend by proclamation
the privilege of importing certain commodities duty-free from countries which refused
to deal reciprocally with the tOnited States. This was considered as implying power
to enter into reciprocal trade agreements. Ten, such agreements were concluded. Sec-
tion 3 of the Act of 1897 explicitly authorized the President to make reciprocal trade
agreements without Senatorial ratification, and sixteen were concluded under this Act.
CRANDALL, Op. cit. mtpra note 76, at 122-124. For statutes authorizing executive agree-
ments in related fields, see Coawnr, op. cit. mpra note 77, at 116-125; Moore. supra
note 82, at 394, 395.
111. See Cozy, DELEGATED LEGiSLATio (1921) 27-41.
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in preparation and already concluded. And finally no agreement may last
more than three years if Congress wishes to terminate it.
The administrative technique used in drawing up the reciprocal agree-
ments has been severely censured for a secrecy of negotiation reminiscent of
"star chamber" proceedings."' Objections are made because the names of
the members of the sub-committee of the interdepartmental Committee for
Trade Agreements are not disclosed. Furthermore, it has been pointed out
that business men have not had an adequate opportunity to present their
point of view before the Committee for Reciprocity Information, because they
never knew which articles of commerce were to be affected by the negotia-
tions. At best they were forced to guess from the bare trade statistics issued
by the Committee. It has also been alleged that the briefs filed are never
read, that the oral statements are nevei listened to, and that the agreements
are all virtually completed before holding the public hearings, which are only
designed to appease Congress and the business men of the nation. That
much of this criticism may have been justified is perhaps evidenced by the
State Department's recent announcement that henceforth the items contem-
plated for negotiation will be revealed before the public hearings are had 3
The administration has contended, however, that considerable secrecy is
necessary to protect the interests of the nation as a whole.d It is felt that
tariffs must inevitably remain a football of pressure group activity and
Congressional log-rolling in the absence of delegation of the rate-mating
power to technical non-partisan bodies, shielded, at least during the period
of negotiation, from the influence of those who have personal interests at
stake. While it is not impossible that log-rolling will occur in formulating the
reciprocal trade agreements, it will at least be log-rolling on a national scale,
as contrasted to the rough and tumble scramble for individual subsidies
characteristic of tariff-making in Congress and in its Committees. That
the policy has been successful from this point of view is indicated by the
small number of charges of political favoritism directed against it which are
usually so conspicuous after Congressional tariff legislation." 0
Objections are also made to the way the bargaining authorized by the
statute has been carried out, on the ground that the United States has given
more than it received in terms of trade. One fact pointed out by proponents
of this view is that American imports have increased under the trade agree-
112. See P=, W y QurT Our Ovn;? (1936) 235-259.
113. N. Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1937, p. 4, col. 6.
114. Deinel, Trade Agreements in a Balanced Tariff Policy, Address delivered before
the Southern Political Science Ass'n, Nov. 5, 1936, mimeographed material furnished by
State Department, p. S.
115. See Bmis, A DipO'ounc HISTORy OF THE UIIT1 STATES (1936) 749; Berg-
lund, The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of z934 (1935) 25 Amoz. Eco.a RM.
411, 425; Harding, Foreign Trade in the Public Interest (1936) 158 AT.. Mo_, mLy 630.
116. Ballagh, Bargains in Tariff (1935) 34 Ai mt. 192.
19371 667
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ments more than exports, from which it is concluded on familiar mercantilist
grounds that the United States is losing in the exchange; it is felt that the
power to make reciprocal trade agreements should have been used solely to
build up a further surplus of American exports.117 Although this is not an
occasion to discuss the objections to this view at length, two points can be
made briefly. In the first place, since the United States is a creditor on
international capital account, it must have an import surplus of goods or of
gold, or an export surplus of capital to keep its international payments in
balance. Any policy which tends to increase imports relatively to exports
therefore helps to reduce the instability of its international economic posi-
tion."1 In the second place, and more generally, it should be emphasized
in a controversy of this kind that, as a matter of economics, a reduction in
tariffs is not a "loss" or a concession, as economic nationalists contend, but
an unqualified economic benefit to the country reducing its tariffs, a gain to
which the existence of tariffs in other countries is irrelevant.110 "The exist-
ence of tariffs elsewhere may reduce the total gain from foreign trade which
it is open to the country to secure. Whether there are tariffs elsewhere or
not, she can only realize the total gain which is open to her by not having
tariffs herself." 1 20
A related objection to the tactical side of the Trade Agreements Act is
its adoption of the unconditional most-favored-nation principle. 1 Both the
objection to the unconditional most-favored-nation relationship and its
strongest defense are that it prevents extremes of tariff bargaining. Those
opposed to, the administration program contend that the unconditional most-
favored-nation provision operates to give many countries the benefits of
lower tariff rates withou.t their conceding any trade advantage to the United
States in return, and it is conceivable that some countries will refuse to
negotiate any agreement, preferring to remain inactive and accept the ad-
vantages procured by the concessions of other nations 1 22 Eventually these
uncompensated benefits might operate to remove the motive for any further
117. E. g., our exports to Brazil increased $3,242,544 between 1934 and 1935, but our
imports from Brazil increased $8,202,755 for the same period. See P=nx, WHY QuiT
Ou OwN? (1936) 265.
118. RoGERs, AmEiRcA WErGHs HER Gor (1931) c. 4-7, p. 193 et Seq.; SALvan,
REcovERY, THE SECOND ErroRT (1932); TAUssIG, INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1928) c. 25.
119. HARROD, INTERNATIONAL EcoNxoics (1933) C. 3; TAUSSIG, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1928) c. 16; WHALE, INTERNATio.AL TaDE (1932) c. 5.
120. HAI aoD, op. cit. sepra, note 119, at 187; WHAL, op. cit. mupra, note 119, at 133.
121. See PEE=, WHY QuIT OuR OwN? (1936) 234-238, 245-256.
122. It was alleged that the hesitation of the Brazilian Congress in ratifying the
agreement with the United States was due to the fact that coffee had already been
"bound" to the free list by the agreement with Haiti. The real difficulty, however, lay
in the fact that certain of the advantages of the Brazilian-German exchange control
agreement were affected by the pact with the United States. Smith, Devclopnient of
.Policy under the Trade Agreements Program (1936) 50 Q. J. EcoN. 297.
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agreements and destroy the bargaining power of the United States with those
nations which have not yet entered into negotiations. But the executive
may protect itself against such tactics. It is possible for the President to
place such a recalcitrant government on the restricted list, or to reduce the
duty on an article less than the permitted 507, retaining the power to reduce
it still further as a bargaining weapon to be used in another future agree-
ment. It has also been found feasible to word the concessions by careful
subdivision of tariff classification, so that only the commodities of the nation
involied in the pact are affected by the reduction.Y3 In addition, the State
Department has set forth the principle of lowering duty rates on commodities
imported from a given nation only if that country is the principal source
of supply, so that others will gain very little by the reduction.12- This policy
of course overlooks the fact that sources of supply shift, so that a reduction
might appear to affect one nation one year but might operate to the benefit
of others in a later year;'; and it is also true that this principle, if strictly
adhered to, would preclude the possibility of an agreement with those coun-
tries that are not the principal source of supply of any comodity.'2G But
the final answer to these objections is that most of tue trade agreements
include an escape clause which provides that if a third nation receives a
major part of the benefits from any concession, the allowance may be with-
drawn after due notice by the nation granting iL' -7 These bargaining re-
sources should not, however, obscure the fact that a policy of unconditional
most-favored-nation relationships imposes prohibitive penalties on the prac-
tice of aggressive tariff bargaining; but such practices, which involve fre-
quent changes in tariff rates, and serious interruptions of trade, have con-
sistently been regarded as economically undesirable.'2s
Legally and structurally, the Trade Agreements Act seems a model of
statutory effectiveness. 2 9 It is clear, easily construed, and constitutionally
orthodox; procedure under it is simple and now provides adequate security
for the protection of interests affected by its application, as well as sufficient
protection to tariff negotiators against the pressure of special interests; and
123. Concessions on linens from Belgium were so worded. B'ineu r Weel., March 9.
1935, p. 32.
124. Hearigs before Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 86S7, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934) 114. But see PEr, WHY QUIT OUR Owzr? (1936) 251, for a list of
commodities on which concessions have been made to countries which were not the
principal source of supply.
125. Id. at 246. The principal source of the supply of imported cement, for eample,
shifted three times between 1930 and 1933.
126. Id. at 250.
127. See, e.g., AGmrmn wITH SwEDE, Art. XIV.
128. WHAm., op. cit. supra note 119, 216-232, esp. 224-225.
129. See Stowell, Secretary Hvtll' Trade Agreements (1935) 29 .L J. iz. I.
280, 282.
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